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A basis for legitimacy based on emotion, especially the identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems" such as underdevelopment or insurgency;
Minimal social mobilization most often caused by constraints on the public such as suppression of political opponents and anti-regime activity;
Informally defined executive power with often vague and shifting powers.
Authoritarian government and states
Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, the Catholic Church, Falange, monarchists, technocrats and others). Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support. Some scholars also mention the emergence of a different type of regime - the hybrid regime - in the post-Cold War era.
Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others. Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:
Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling authority (generally a single person)" is maintained in power "through a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patron-client ties and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties". An example is Ethiopia under Haile Selassie I.
Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are those "governed by a coalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically (rather than ideologically) within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality."Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" such as South Korea under Park Chung-hee.
Linz also has identified three other subtypes of authoritarian regime: corporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy" and post-totalitarian.
Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatism institutions are used extensively by the state to coopt and demobilize powerful interest groups". This type has been studied most extensively in Latin America.
Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democratic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights", such as in South Africa under apartheid.
Post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes are those in which totalitarian institutions (such as the party, secret police and state-controlled mass media) remain, but where "ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state's top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially". Examples include the Russian Federation and SovietEastern bloc states in the mid-1980s.
Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are personalistic or populist. Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule and authority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules". Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups". Examples include Argentina under Perón, Egypt under Nasser and Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro.
Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential challengers. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime.Adam Przeworski has theorized that "authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear and economic prosperity".
Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise of political power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors", the arbitrary deprivation of civil liberties and little tolerance for meaningful opposition.
Authoritarian political systems may be weakened through "inadequate performance to demands of the people". Vestal writes that the tendency to respond to challenges to authoritarianism through tighter control instead of adaptation is a significant weakness and that this overly rigid approach fails to "adapt to changes or to accommodate growing demands on the part of the populace or even groups within the system". Because the legitimacy of the state is dependent on performance, authoritarian states that fail to adapt may collapse.
Totalitarianism is an extreme version of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:
Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms of autocracy, they differ in "key dichotomies":
(1) Unlike their bland and generally unpopular authoritarian brethren, totalitarian dictators develop a charismatic "mystique" and a mass-based, pseudo-democratic interdependence with their followers via the conscious manipulation of a prophetic image.
(2) Concomitant role conceptions differentiate totalitarians from authoritarians. Authoritarians view themselves as individual beings largely content to control and often maintain the status quo. Totalitarian self-conceptions are largely teleological. The tyrant is less a person than an indispensable function to guide and reshape the universe.
(3) Consequently, the utilisation of power for personal aggrandizement is more evident among authoritarians than totalitarians. Lacking the binding appeal of ideology, authoritarians support their rule by a mixture of instilling fear and granting rewards to loyal collaborators, engendering a kleptocracy.
Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invades private life and asphyxiates it". Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature".Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of ... industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.
A further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars (sometimes called militarized interstate disputes) causing fewer battle deaths with one another and that democracies have far fewer civil wars.
Some commentators, such as Seymour Martin Lipset, believed that low-income authoritarian regimes have certain technocratic "efficiency-enhancing advantages" over low-income democracies, helping authoritarian regimes generate development.Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein (2005) counter this belief, arguing that the evidence has shown that there is no "authoritarian advantage" and that there is a "democratic advantage" instead. Halperin et al. argue that democracies "realize superior development performance" over authoritarianism. They point out that poor democracies are more likely to have steadier economic growth and less likely to experience economic and humanitarian catastrophes than authoritarian regimes; that civil liberties act as a curb on corruption and misuse of resources; and that democracies are more adaptable. Halperin point out that the vast majority of refugee crises and financial catastrophes occur in authoritarian regimes.
Studies suggest that several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, size of the public sector or income inequality. Prominent economist Amartya Sen has theorized that no functioning liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scale famine.
Research shows that the democratic nations have much less democide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies. Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption. One study has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least amount of terrorism are the most and least democratic nations.
Systemic weakness and resilience
Andrew J. Nathan notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, overcentralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms....Few authoritarian regimes--be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist--have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions". One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors: (1) "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; (2) "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; (3) "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and (4) "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large".
Gender and authoritarianism
According to a study by Brandt and Henry, there is a direct correlation between the rates of gender inequality and the levels of authoritarian ideas in the male and female populations. It was found that in countries with less gender equality where individualism was encouraged and men occupied the dominant societal roles, women were more likely to support traits such as obedience which would allow them to survive in an authoritarian environment and less likely to encourage ideas such as independence and imagination. In countries with higher levels of gender equality, men held less authoritarian views. It is theorized that this occurs due to the stigma attached to individuals who question the cultural norms set by the dominant individuals and establishments in an authoritarian society as a way to prevent the psychological stress caused by the active ostracizing of the stigmatized individuals.
People's Republic of China under the Communist Party of China (1949-) "Some scholars have deemed the Chinese system a 'fragmented authoritarianism' (Lieberthal), a 'negotiated state' or a 'consultative authoritarian regime'" According to research by John Kennedy at al. (2018), Chinese citizens with higher education tend to participate less in local elections and have lower levels of democratic values when compared to those with only compulsory education.
Iran under Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei (1981-) Linz wrote in 2000 that "it is difficult to fit the Iranian regime into the existing typology, as it combines the ideological bent of totalitarianism with the limited pluralism of authoritarianism and holds regular elections in which candidates advocating differing policies and incumbents are often defeated"
World War II saw the defeat of the Axis powers -- all made up of totalitarian or authoritarian governments, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the Empire of Japan -- by the Allied powers, an alliance of Democratic states and (later) the Communist Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state, the other Allied powers were not and at least in Western Europe the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and nazism was denigrated, the new Federal Republic of Germany for example banning its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, for example, the new constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteen Länder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government (at least not at first).
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Soviet Union in 1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of WWII collapsed. This led to not so much revolt against authority but the idea that authoritarian states (and state control of economies) were outdated,
and that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed", became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated in Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History and the Last Man. According to Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving toward democracy in the early 1990s," as where the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans.
By the decade of 2005 to 2015 observers have noted what some called a "democratic recession" (although some -- Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way -- have disputed this theory). In 2018 Freedom House declared that over the twelve-year period from 2006 to 2018, their measurement of "political rights and civil liberties" around the world showed "113 countries have seen a net decline ... and only 62 have experienced a net improvement."
Writing in 2018, U.S. political journalist David Frum states
The hopeful world of the very late 20th century--the world of NAFTA and an expanding NATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such as Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela--now looks battered and delusive."
Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment". Fukuyama himself expressed concern. By 2018 the only Arab Spring uprising that resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance was in Tunisia and succeeding and ongoing conflicts were dubbed the "Arab Winter".
Explanations offered for this development by its supporters include excessive immigration into European and Western countries, and the "primary and existential fear" of the "surrender" by liberal democracy of national sovereignty and independence. Others include the downside of globalization, and the success of the Beijing Consensus, i.e. the authoritarian model of the People's Republic of China, In at least one country (the U.S.) factors credited with growth of authoritarianism include "status-lowering developments", such as the Financial crisis of 2007-2008 and slower real wage growth; and the disappearance of "gatekeepers" of knowledge, so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts" - everything from global warming to the utility of vaccinating children.
^Juan de Onis, "After Chavez, Authoritarianism Still Threatens Latin America", World Affairs (May 15, 2013): "the followers of the late President Hugo Chávez continue to apply the playbook of authoritarian populism throughout Latin America in their pursuit of more power...one of the Mercosur partners are challenging the basic political practices of authoritarian populism implanted in Venezuela."
^Hsu, Jennifer Y. J.; Hsu, Carolyn L.; Hasmath, Reza (2016). "NGO Strategies in an Authoritarian Context, and their Implications for Citizenship: The Case of the People's Republic of China". American Sociological Association Annual Meeting (Seattle), August 20-23.: 1. SSRN2657187.
^Duckitt, J. (1989). "Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct". Political Psychology. 10 (1): 63-84. doi:10.2307/3791588. JSTOR3791588. (Registration required (help)).
^Kemmelmeier, M.; Burnstein, E.; Krumov, K.; Genkova, P.; Kanagawa, C.; Hirshberg, M. S.; Erb, H. P.; Wieczorkowska, G.; Noels, K. A. (2003). "Individualism, Collectivism, and Authoritarianism in Seven Societies". Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. 34 (3): 304. doi:10.1177/0022022103034003005.
^ abSondrol, P. C. (2009). "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner". Journal of Latin American Studies. 23 (3): 599. doi:10.1017/S0022216X00015868.
^ abcRadu Cinpoes, Nationalism and Identity in Romania: A History of Extreme Politics from the Birth of the State to EU Accession, p. 70.
Thomas H. Henriksen, American Power after the Berlin Wall (Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 199: "experts emphasize that elections alone, without the full democratic panoply of an independent judiciary, free press, and viable political parties, constitute, in reality, illiberal democracies, which still menace their neighbors and destabilize their regions."
David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 231: "Illiberal democracies may have reasonably free and fair national elections based on broad suffrage, but they do not counteract the tyranny of the majority with effective protections for ethnic and religious minorities or various types of dissenters."
Rod Hague & Martin Harrop, Political Science: A Comparative Introduction (7th ed.: Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 259: "The gradual implementation of the rule of law and due process is an accomplishment of liberal politics, provide a basis for distinguishing liberal from illiberal democracies, and both from authoritarian regimes."
Vladimir Popov, "Circumstances versus Policy Choices: Why Has the Economic Performance of the Soviet Successor States Been So Poor" in After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition (eds. Michael McFaul & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 20: "The least efficient institutions are in illiberal democracies combining poor rule of law with democracy ... Less democratic regimes with weak rule of law ... appear to do better than illiberal democracies in maintaining institutional capacity."
^Brandt, Mark J.; Henry, P. J. (2012). "Gender Inequality and Gender Differences in Authoritarianism". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 38 (10): 1301-15. doi:10.1177/0146167212449871. PMID22733982.
^Vincent, Rebecca (19 May 2013). "When the music dies: Azerbaijan one year after Eurovision". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2013. Over the past several years, Azerbaijan has become increasingly authoritarian, as the authorities have used tactics such as harassment, intimidation, blackmail, attack and imprisonment to silence the regime's critics, whether journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, political activists or ordinary people taking to the streets in protest.
^Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (2011), Harvard University Press, pp. 5, 14-15; Kira D. Baiasu, Sustaining Authoritarian RuleArchived January 2, 2013, at the Wayback Machine. Fall 2009, Volume 10, Issue 1 (September 30, 2009), Northwestern Journal of International Affairs.
^Neil J. Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road (Harwood Academic, 2000), pp. 28-30.
^Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Limits of Islam" in Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity (Oxford University Press, 2012: eds. Rainer Grote & Tilmann J. Röder), p. 428.
^Todd L. Edwards, Argentina: A Global Studies Handbook (2008), pp. 45-46; Steven E. Sanderson, The Politics of Trade in Latin American Development (1992), Stanford University Press, p. 133; William C. Smith, Reflections on the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Capitalist Reorganization in Contemporary Argentina, in Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America (1985), eds. Philip J. O'Brien & Paul A. Cammack, Manchester University Press.
^Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective (University of California Press, 1988); James M. Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern, in Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles (1996; ed. Roderic A. Camp), p. 122; Howard J. Wiards, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "ism" (1997), pp. 113-14.
^James M. Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern, in Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles (ed. Roderic A. Camp), p. 122; Thomas E. Skidmore, The Political Economy of Policy-making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1967-70, in Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America (1985), eds. Philip J. O'Brien & Paul A. Cammack, Manchester University Press.
^Steven E. Sanderson, The Politics of Trade in Latin American Development (1992), Stanford University Press, p. 133; Carlos Huneeus, Political Mass Mobilization Against Authoritarian Rule: Pinochet's Chile, 1983-88, in Civil Resistance and Power Politics:The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (2009), Oxford University Press (eds. Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton Ash).
^Leng, Shao-chuan; Lin, Cheng-yi (1993). "Political Change on Taiwan: Transition to Democracy?". The China Quarterly (136): 805-39. ISSN0305-7410. JSTOR655592. (Registration required (help)).; Shirley A. Kan, Congressional Research Service, Democratic Reforms in Taiwan: Issues for Congress (May 26, 2010); Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (1996), eds. Charles Chi-Hsiang Chang & Hung-Mao Tien; Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game:Why China's Rise Doesn't Threaten the West (2010), Oxford University Press, pp. 217-22.
^"The way of the hippie is antithetical to all repressive hierarchical power structures since they are adverse to the hippie goals of peace, love and freedom ... Hippies don't impose their beliefs on others. Instead, hippies seek to change the world through reason and by living what they believe."Stone 1994, "The Way of the Hippy"